The purpose of this contribution is to investigate why private insurance of the risk of long-term care (LTC) has known little market success in major industrialized countries, even among the relatively well-to-do. Using a principal-agent framework, it shows that the purchase of LTC insurance by the parent (the principal) is likely to diminish the amount of LTC provided by the major caregivers; namely children earning a comparatively low wage in the labor market. Anticipating this moral hazard effect, the parent is predicted to renounce the purchase of LTC coverage in many cases. This finding throws serious doubts on the welfare effects of recent moves to introduce compulsory social LTC insurance, as, for example, in Germany.
INTRODUCTION
The need of long-term care (LTC) is a new risk facing the population of industrialized countries. For example, the number of individuals aged 80 and older (who are believed to be most exposed to this risk) is predicted to grow from 6.3 million in 1992 to 17.7 million by the year 2040 in the United States of America and from 1.65 million in 1991 to 2.3 million by the year 2030 in Germany (see Eisen, 1992) .
One response to the problem is to introduce compulsory long-term care insurance, as recently decided by the German parliament. The economic justification of compulsion may be that private demand for LTC insurance is undermined by a moral hazard effect emanating from public welfare (see Buchholz and Wiegard, 1992) . However, this solution has the severe drawback of imposing something for which there is no private demand. Pauly (1990) argues that a parent's demand for LTC insurance suffers from a second moral hazard effect because children may decide to diminish their care giving in favor of care provided by third parties, the cost of which is lowered by compulsory LTC.
This argument calls for an explicit modeling of parent-child interaction in the context of long-term care. However, the economic literature on this issue is characterized by a curious asymmetry. Typically, altruistic parents are assumed to influence egotistical children, as in Becker (1974) . His "rotten kid theorem" posits that altruistic parents need not impose their will on their egotistical children because they can use transfer payments to induce the behavior they desire. However, the underlying assumption is that the children will never increase their wealth to the point of reducing the total wealth jointly available to the two generations. It is this assumption that, in fact, serves to limit egotism on the part of the child and permits the parent to prevail. Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) assume that the child values long-term care activities positively at first but negatively beyond a value known to the parent ex ante. Moreover, they do not consider the possibility of LTC being provided by a third party, thus failing to recognize the incentive effects of the different LTC instruments.
In this article, both parent and child are modeled as self-interested actors in a principal-agent setting. However, the parent as the principal is viewed as being unable to sanction shirking on the part of the child when the LTC risk materializes. The model may be used to examine the question of whether moral hazard effects are indeed strong enough as to demand for private LTC insurance, as predicted by Pauly (1990) . 1 The next section expounds a two-generation model in which the parent has the option of buying long-term care insurance in an attempt to deal with the financial risk of LTC. Both parent and child pursue their own interests, which differ only due to the different position in the life cycle of the two parties. The child's optimization problem is defined and then analyzed in order to determine the effects of the purchase of LTC insurance by the parent on his or her behavior. The following analysis builds on these results to predict the parent's optimal decision with regard to LTC insurance, anticipating the child's opportunistic response to the incentives created. The final section deals with the consequences of compulsory LTC insurance and compares private LTC insurance with alternatives for financing LTC, especially a trust saving contract.
THE MODEL
In most formulations of intergenerational transfers, the parents are typically assumed to act altruistically when the interests of their children are involved. However, when it comes to decide about long-term care, parents deal with mature offspring rather than helpless babies, and the children may themselves be parents as well. These considerations suggest a symmetric treatment of the two generations. One way to achieve this is to extend the model to cover three periods, in the guise of Hansson and Stuart (1989) . During a previous period (t = -1), the 1 Therefore, the existence of public welfare is simply ignored. Distributional issues are entirely abstracted from (see Breyer, 1991/92, and Eisen 1994) . current parentm was affected by the grandparent's LTC risk (see the upper part of figure 1). At that time, the parent had to make certain decisions with regard to the amount of LTC to be given to the grandparent, which are considered irreversible at time t = 0, the period of interest. In the first place, the grandparent may have died already; moreover, dispositions made previously (such as referral to a home) can often be modified at exceedingly high cost only. To be sure, the parent's endowed wealth depends importantly on whether the grandparent's LTC risk materialized. However, the amount of wealth W P will be considered predetermined at time t = 0, when the parent is about to make the decision. The objective function of the parent thus might read max.
, ,
At t = 0, the parent controls two decision variables (see Table 1 for a list of variables). Having terminated working life, the parent's work hours are assumed to be zero. This leaves consumption (C P ) and the amount of LTC insurance purchased (reflected by the premium R P ) to be decided upon. LTC insurance provides for partial coverage of the net cost of LTC, which is falling on the parent is determined by the rate of coinsurance c, which in its turn depends negatively on the premium R P , because additional premiums buy relief from cost sharing.
At t = 1, the parent's demand for LTC depends on the probability of being able to take care of himself or herself to the end of his or her life. In the event of needing LTC (having probability π), this utility depends on the amount of care received from the u child A L K (over which the parent has no control) and final wealth W L P . The inclusion of final wealth in the parent's utility function does not reflect an (altruistic) bequest motive but the uncertainty about time of death (which, however, is not modeled formally here). Consumption is considered unimportant under LTC conditions, its cost being simply subsumed in pH, the gross cost of LTC provided by third parties. By assumption, the LTC insurance policy stipulates premium payments both at t = 0 and t = 1, causing R The lower part of Figure 1 shows the optimization problem of the child, to be more formally analyzed in the next section. At t = 0, the child is in the same situation as the parent at t = -1, who had to determine the amount of LTC and to plan final wealth. By giving care, the child sacrifices time available for work, which is thus given by (T A L K − ); on the other hand, the child may count on receiving a higher bequest W L P . In principle, the child's planning horizon should extend beyond t = 2; however, for simplicity, it is assumed that (as in the case of the parent at the time) only the decision concerning A L K must be made, whereas the decisions with regard to consumption in a later phase of active life and the purchase of LTC insurance is deferred to a later period.
In the event of the parent needing long-term care, the utility function of the child comprises consumption C K , LTC provided A L K and final wealth W L K .
While consumption and wealth are considered normal goods
positive, it reflects the assumption that the child likes to provide LTC to the parent, presumably motivated by altruism. However, it may well be that the child hates to be burdened by Figure 1 again). On the other hand, the child can count a larger bequest W L P if he or she contributes to long-term care, which serves to add to disposable wealth. Finally, in the event that the parent's LTC risk does not materialize, no LTC has to be provided, causing the labor income of the child to be larger.
Moreover, the child receives bequest W N P .
Conclusion 1
LTC activity may be modeled using a principal-agent representation of the relationship between child and parent without assuming anything but self-interest on both sides. In particular, caring activity on the part of the child need not be defined as good or bad; rather, it is characterized by its impact on consumption and final wealth. Because the parent must know the child's response to his or her decision when trying to find out how much long-term care insurance to buy (if at all), it is necessary to model the child's decision problem first.
OPTIMIZATION BY THE CHILD
In keeping with the sequence of decisions shown in Figure 1 , the child first fixes consumption, that is, a certain standard of living for the rest of his or her working life. It is only later, at the time when the parent's long-term care risk materializes, that the decision with regard to LTC will be made. Given that the consumption decision is made under risk, the optimization problem reads, assuming expected utility maximization, max ,
The pertinent first-order condition is given by
in view of the wealth constraints shown in Figure 1 and detailed in equations (A1) and (A3) 
In the following, it is assumed that w ≠ cp, implying that the marginal opportunity cost of providing long-term care differs from its marginal return in the guise of avoided payment of cost sharing. Since the parent contracts L.T.C. insurance and not the child, this inequality will be the rule rather than the exception. Moreover, even in the well-developed market for private health insurance, policies tend to be rather standardized with regard to the rate of coinsurance. The amount of product differentiation is likely to be still less in the market for LTC insurance, which is about to develop, implying that the equality w = cp will be satisfied only in exceptional cases.
The solution to equation (4) 
In the case w > cp, the reverse result 
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF CHILD BEHAVIOR
This section analyzes the child's response to the purchase of (additional) longterm care insurance by the parent. The predicted response is of great importance to the parent, who values care given by the child in the event that he or she should have to rely on LTC. The purchase of LTC insurance serves to disturb the optimality conditions of the child, who will adjust the decision variables A L K and C K in a way as to neutralize the impact of this disturbance. In keeping with the argument above, comparative static analysis will be confined to the neighborhood of an interior
Since the denominator of equation (5) 
The negative sign of the first term can be justified with reference to a more general model of household production (Becker, 1965) . Although additional final wealth W L K entails greater utility, its marginal utility declines when time for utilization of this wealth becomes scarce due to time spent on long-term care.
The sign of the expression in brackets is positive as long as the probability π of occurrence of LTC does not exceed a certain limit of π 0 . Generally, the relationship between additional benefits (X) an additional premium ( R P ) is given by dX dR P = 1 π if the premium is marginally fair, implying dX dR P > 1 because of 0 ≤ π ≤ 1. Especially in the case of long-term care insurance, however, the insurer will charge a loading g for administrative expense and risk, causing the relationship between benefits and premium to become dX dR g P = + 1 1 π a f l q. Therefore, if π execs the limit value π 0 1 1
the insured will obtain less than a dollar's worth of benefits for a dollar's worth of premium. 2 It is under these circumstances that the bracketed expression of equation (6) would be negative. Since a policy that offers less than the premium in exchange for benefits will not find a market, the case π > π 0 will not be pursued further.
In sum, equations (5) and (6) 
Conclusion 2
The child's predicted response to long-term care insurance purchased by the parent depends importantly the wage rate that the child earns or could earn in the labor market. If this wage rate is below the net price of LTC provided by a third party (after deduction of insurance benefits), improved coverage against the risk of LTC causes the amount of the child's caregiving to decrease. If, however, this wage rate exceeds the net price of long-term care, additional coverage has an ambiguous impact. Intuitively, this conclusion hinges on the fact that the child can afford to reduce his or her own caring activity thanks to increased LTC insurance coverage, being less constrained to spare wealth by giving care himself or herself. This holds true quite independently of whether the child likes or dislikes caregiving. In the process of adjustment, the marginal utility of wealth decreases; this effect may possibly cause the child to provide more care, but only if doing this has greater influence on final wealth than does the change of LTC coverage, that is, only if the attainable wage rate exceeds the net money price of care.
For future use, the sign of dC dR K P is also established. In analogy to Since π must be small for long-term care insurance to be economically viable (see the discussion below equation 6), one is led to conclude that dC dR
OPTIMIZATION BY THE PARENT

The Child as an Agent
For convenience, the objective function of the parent is repeated here (see equation 1), max , ,
The particularity of the parent's situation can be seen in his or her inability to control the decisions of the child, symbolized by the child's choices {C A
at the time the long-term risk is about to materialize. For one, observing with regard to consumption C K may frequently be lacking; moreover and more importantly, the cost of sanctioning the child for deviations in care giving activity A L K from the value deemed optimal by the parent may well be excessive for a parent in need of long-term care. For these reasons, the parent is assumed to treat the child like an agent whose optimal decisions must be accepted as given. 2 In order to ensure incentive compatibility, the child's necessary conditions enter the 2 This means that A K L is not in the set of variables under the parent's control, causing the so-called enforcement function to be dropped (see Rees 1985 , for formulations of the principal-agent problem with and without enforcement). parent's optimization problem in the guise of the following two constraints (see equations 3 and 4)
Equations (11) and (12) are the incentive compatibility constraints. Since the child may always renege on the implicit contract with the parent by breaking the family ties, which would be associated with expected utility EU K , the parent must also observe the following participation constraint:
This constraint is entered as equality in the Lagrangean representing the parent's optimization problem,
Out of the three decision variables, only R P , the amount of long-term care insurance purchased, shall be considered.
Optimal Purchase of Long-Term Care Insurance from the Parent's Point of View
When deciding about LTC insurance, the parent must take the child's likely responses into account, which, in turn, modify his or her own expected utility as well as the incentive compatibility and participation constraints incorporated in equation (14) . For this reason, the total differentials dA dR L K P and dC dR K P are present in the differentiation of equation (14) with respect to R P . Using the signs derived in the Appendix, one has 
Since R P must necessarily be nonnegative whereas the parent might prefer a negative value, it is appropriate to check for a negative value of equation (15). In that event, the corner solution R P* = 0 prevails.
In discussing equation (15) The first three terms of equation (15) mirror the effect of purchasing longterm care insurance on the parent. Given a marginally fair premium In the case of a marginally unfair premium, the first term of equation (15) is already negative, and the sum of the second and third terms tends toward a negative value as well. Evidently, if parents did not take into account the incentive compatibility and participation constraints imposed on them, many would refrain from purchasing long-term care insurance ( R P* = 0).
However, additional influences emanate from the agency relationship (terms in λ, µ, and ν). Their total effect is ambiguous, even if terms in µ (relating to incentive compatibility with respect to child's consumption) are disregarded. On one hand, given that w < cp, the term in λ is positive (see A5 of the appendix), indicating the parent's reduced dependence on incentive compatibility on the part of the child due to improved LTC insurance coverage. On the other hand, w < cp induces the response dA dR 
Conclusion 3
If the child curtails caring activity in response to the parent's purchase of longterm care insurance (a response that must be expected in case of a low wage rate) the purchase of LTC insurance would run counter to the parent's personal interest in many cases. If, however, the child can count on earning a high wage rate, LTC insurance may be in the parent's interest. In order to obtain more definite results, the limiting cases (π → 0, π → 1) may be analyzed. However, π → 1 would cause π to exceed the limiting value π 0 , which precludes the purchase of LTC insurance, as shown in the context of equation (6). Therefore, it remains to be seen whether with π → 0, LTC insurance would be contracted. In this case, equation (15) reduces approximately to 
Conclusion 4
For a parent constituting a good risk, the purchase of long-term care insurance would run counter to his or her personal interest. However, the parent may decide otherwise in view of the necessity to respect the incentive compatibility and participation constraints imposed by the child.
CONCLUSION
These concluding remarks are based on a model that does not posit altruism between generations. When deciding about providing for long-term care risk, the parent nevertheless cannot regard his or her own interests in the narrow sense but must take into account the likely responses on the part of the child. In particular, buying long-term care insurance often is not in the parent's personal interest because it is exactly in the case of the child having a comparatively low wage rate (w < cp), a situation basically encouraging care giving, that to the parent must take into account diminished LTC activity on the part of the child (see Table 2 ). The moral hazard effect discussed by Pauly (1990) thus strikes precisely where its impact is greatest. As long as the bulk of care is given by children who are not in the labor market, this likely response undermines a parent's possible interest in long-term care insurance in many cases. These results suggest that compulsory LTC insurance may cause a welfare loss to a large fraction of the older generation. Three aspects merit special attention.
The uniform coverage of compulsory LTC insurance violates the incentive compatibility and participation constraints of the children, which call for tailormade solutions. Therefore, it causes the principal-agent relationship between parents and children to become less efficient.
Solving the problems by compulsory LTC insurance necessarily aggravates the moral hazard effect falling on parents. Anticipating it, many parents would refrain from buying LTC coverage at all, a choice not available under social insurance.
Finally, many people may prefer other financial instruments for providing for long-term care. In particular, some banks offer a trust saving contract tailored to the needs of an individual facing the risk of LTC. Under a variant also known as reverse mortgage (Jacobs and Weissert, 1986) , the homeowner is required to pay back the major part of his or her mortgage such that the net value of the real property attains a specified value. In the event that the long-term care risk materializes, the bank obtains title of ownership of the real property. In return, the elderly person receives a contribution toward covering the cost of LTC, retaining the right to live in the home as long he or she chooses. Such a contract is much more in the self-interest of parents, being less affected by intergenerational moral hazard than is LTC insurance, because it gives less incentives to those who have traditionally provided much of informal caregiving to diminish their efforts (see Zweifel and Strüwe, 1996) .
In sum, compulsory insurance of long-term care is double-edged: On the one hand, it solves the adverse selection problem caused by the existence of public welfare in the lower part of the income and wealth distribution. On the other hand, it aggravates the moral hazard effects between parents and children in the middle and upper part of the income and wealth distribution.
Therefore, it may be worthwhile to consider a means-tested voucher system as an alternative that prevents the elderly from impoverishment due to the financial burden of long-term care while preserving consumer choice and keeping public expenditure predictable by avoiding the open-ended commitments that have characterized social health insurance (see Felder and Zweifel, 1994) . This means that the sign of the first term in equation (15) is uncertain. The sign of the second term (in π) derives from equation (A2) and depends on equation (7) in the text. The sign of the third term (in [1 -π]) follows from equations (A3) and (A4). The sign of the fourth term depends on [w -cp] , as shown in equation (6):
The fifth term (in µπ) of equation (15) refers again to the situation where longterm care risk materializes. It corresponds to the first term of equation (8): Moreover, the sixth term can be signed using the analogy to the second term of equation (8) 
With probability (1 -π), the parent does not need long-term care, and the eighth and final term of equation (15) 
